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If a foreigner visiting England in 18981 were to have asked that
famous man on the Clapham omnibus to describe an English market
our visitor might have heard a colourful evocation of a busy market
place in which crafty market traders who enthusiastically hawked
their goods in a rich vernacular were always assured of a crowd,
despite the sometimes shoddy nature or dubious origin of the goods
sold; or our visitor might have heard how country folk, rising long
before dawn, drove their cattle into market pens hours before the
descent ofthe auctioneer, and ofthe astute farmers who might bid for
the best beasts with a sly nod, or a surreptitious hand on a mutton chop
whisker. He might have heard of charters granted to long deceased
lords of the manor whose only modem memorial is perhaps a
recumbent statue in a country church; the tale might have been of
hiring fairs, where masters hired their servants at Michaelmas for the
coming year, or of the great sheep fairs where there were gathered not
only the myriad sheep whose incessant bleating denied all sleep to the
inhabitants ofWeyhill or Marlborough but also the drunken husbands
who sold their wives;2 and the Celtic drovers who counted their money
The first edition of Pease and Chitty's Law ofMarkels and Fairs was published in 1898.
Wife "selling", which was a fonn ofinfonnal divorce by mutual consent practised among the
lower classes, was never particularly common. Where it did occur, a ritualised sale normally took
place in a market or fair in order to obtain maximum publicity. This was, of course, precisely the
same rationale as early markets which were created as a means of witnessing the transfer of title
to goods and thereby avoiding disputes. The practice of "sale" in the market place was adopted
in divorce cases because publicity was important to all parties concerned. It lessened the risk that
the de jure husband would be imprisoned for debts incurred by his (ex) wife and avoided the
possibility that she would claim dower from his estate after his death. The advantage for the wife
was first that the (ex) husband would not in practice exercise his right to claim all her after
acquired property an(1 earnings and secondly, having publicly condoned the adultery could not
bring an action for damages in criminal compensation against her new lover. See generally
Lawrence Stone, Broken Lives, OUP, 1993 especially at pp 18-19 and by the same author The
Road 10 Divorce, OUP, 1990; also Kenny (1929) 45 LQR 474. Research by Menafee (Wives
for Sale, OUP 1981) suggests that wife sales reached a peak of popularity in the first half of the
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in dark comers and eavesdropped on others' news to take back as
gossip to the barren mountain farms in their homelands of Ceredigion
or Gwynedd, Dwyfor or Plynlimmon. And so our visitor would have
heard of a rich trading culture running through the veins of English
history from the days of the Roman legion into modem times.
But ifour visitor, after stepping from the Clapham omnibus, had
shared a hansom cab with the learned jurist, Chitty, he would have
received a very different answer to his question. A market, Chitty
would have explained, is a right of property, an incorporeal
hereditament. It is an exclusive or monopoly right to conduct a market
which allows the owner of the property right to exclude all
competitors.3 Chitty would have added that the English courts may
sometimes enforce this right by closing down those unlawful markets
which inflict damage upon or "disturb" the established lawful market.4
If our visitor, in marvelling at the different answers he had
received, had commented in his diary how strange it was that a nation
so committed to free trade and competition as England should
perpetuate the monopolies of ancient times, with how much more
astonishment might the reader of that diary today learn that these
nineteenth century; but in the 1830s only 51 cases were recorded. Hardy, of course, famously
describes such a sale in The Mayor ofCasterbridge published in 1886 but the imaginary event is
supposed to have taken place at the famous Weyhill Fair circa 1825-30. See the New Wessex
Edition, Macmillan, London 1974. In the decade 1820-1829,49 wife sales were recorded. Stone
suggests that these "sales" were in fact ritualized consensual "divorce", but Kenny adduces some
evidence that this was not always so.
eg Manchester City Council v Walsh (1986) 84 LGR 1. Other market rights enable the owner to
prevent certain sales outside the market during market hours. The Food Act 1984, s56 allows
local authorities to prohibit certain such sales by by-laws. Markets created by statute often
incorporate the provisions of the Markets and Fairs Clauses Act 1847, ofwhich s13 makes it an
offence (subject to certain exceptions) to sell or expose goods for sale articles normally sold in
the market. Only lawful markets benefit from this range ofmonopolistic rights.
There is an irrebuttable presumption that a market held within the common law distance of the
established, lawful market and on the same day as that market is a disturbance of it, entitling the
owner of the latter market to maintain an action against the operator of the rival market. The
operation of the rival market is actionable per se without proof of loss by the owner of tlie lawful
market. The latter will normally seek an injunction to restrain the operation of the rival, in which
case any damages awarded may be nominal: Stoke-an-Trent City Council v W &.J Wa<s (1989)
87 LGR 129. Where the rival market is conducted on a different day from the lawful market it
is essential to establish that it causes loss to the latter. See, for example, Northampton BC v
Midland Development Group ofCompanies (1978) 76 LGR 750.
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monopolies are vigorously continued into an era in which de-
regulation and competition are an article of faith with the government,
and the supreme and directly applicable articles 85 and 86 ofthe Treaty
ofRome mandate a prohibition on certain anti-competitive behaviour?
This article proposes to ask questions about the existence, origin and
extent of these market rights and to indicate some of the
inconsistencies in market law that remain unresolved despite the long
attention devoted to this chapter of the common law. It will also
examine the recent failed attempt of central government to reform
market law and suggest that, even in an age of free markets, such
monopolies have some purpose.5
Which Markets are Lawful?
It is at this point that a definition can be ventured. A market
(whether lawful or unlawful) arises in law whenever there is a
"concourse", or gathering, of buyers and sellers.6 A market can be
distinguished in fact (but not at common law) from a fair. The former
is a frequent trading event; it normally takes place weekly, but may be
held monthly. In contrast, a fair, properly so called, is usually an
annual event, the origins ofwhich sometimes lie in the village festival
held to celebrate the day ofthe patron saint ofthe village church. As a
matter of law both markets and fairs are markets; each is capable of
being a monopoly.
Ibis article is not concerned with the possible conflict between EC Competition Law and aspects
of English market law. For a study of the latter see Hough and Harding, Market Rights and
European Community Competition Law [1995] Cambrian L Rev 55
See per Chatterton V-C in Downshire v O'Brien (1887) 19 LR Ir 380,390. No "concourse"
arises in the case ofa shop since buyers are said to come independently to buy from the owner of
the shop: per Lord Keith Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society v Ulster Farmers' Union
[1960] AC 63, 85-86. However, the definition ofa market does cause problems because some
commercial activities fulfil the definition (and so are ostensibly markets) although it is unlikely
ever to have been intended to subject them to market law. For example, markets and auction sales
share many similarities since each is preceded by an invitation to the public to buy and sell and
neither the owner of the market nor the auctioneer are owners of the goods sold; each provides a
mechanism for facilitating the sales of goods owned by others. If this means that an auction is
capable of constituting a rival market in law it too may be restrained if it disturbs the operation
of a lawful market, see n (4) supra.
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But a caveat must immediately be entered. Not all markets and
fairs are potential monopolies. English law distinguishes markets and
fairs7 according to their origin. Only lawful markets8 are endowed with
legal incidents which are known as the rights of market. It is the
principle of these rights which entitles the market owner to the
undisturbed enjoyment of the right of market, thus giving rise to the
power to prevent the operation of certain rival markets.9 "Informal"
markets (which are not "lawful") are normally the product of
entrepreneurial initiative where market traders operate because it is
profitable to do so. They lack the legal authority of a "lawful" market
and may "disturb" a lawful market conducted in the locality thereby
becoming liable to closure by injunction. 10
To acquire the necessary legal pedigree, the lawful market must
be created either by a franchise, granted under the royal prerogative,
(by charter or by letters patent) or under statute. l1 Market rights may
also arise by prescription or immemorial usage. 12 As a matter of law,
Sunday car boot sales,13 charitable bazaars, some auction sales, and
even indoor "shops" consisting of individually partitioned units,14 are
This discussion is principally concerned with markets and not fairs. Fairs have many of the legal
characteristics of markets but are generally distinguished because they are held less frequently
than markets. Whereas markets are usually held weekly or, occasionally, monthly, fairs are held
in one locality on only one or two occasions in each year.
Lawful markets are created by charter or letters patent under the royal prerogative, or by statute:
see further below. Even lawful markets and fairs cannot exclude all competitors; only those
which" disturb" the lawful market are liable to restraint.
Market rights are vested in the owner ofa charter (or franchise) market: Tamworth BC v Fazeley
Town Council (1979) 77 LOR 238, or ofa statutory market: Manchester City Council v Walsh
(1986) 84 LOR I.
10 Supra, n(4)
B 1 Comm 1, 274; also Downshire v O'Brien, supra (6)
See generally Hough, The Law ofStreet Trading, Earlsgate Press, Winteringham, 1994.
Newcastle-upon-Tyne City Council v Noble 1991,89 LOR 618
Kingston-upon-Hull v Greenwood (1984) 82 LOR 586; Manchester City Council v Walsh (1986)
84 LOR I. Note also East Staffordshire Borough Council v. Windridge Pearce (Burton-an-Trent)
[1993] EOCS 186 where it was emphasised that much would turn on the facts of each individual
case and in particular on the nature and size of individual units, the nature and source of the goods
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all capable of fulfilling the legal definition of a market. Unless they
are operated under the authority of a charter or statute ( and, ofcourse,
few are) they are "informal" and subject to the monopolistic rights of
others.
A sham device intended to disguise what is in substance a rival
market will not avail the would-be organiser: the operation ofthe rival
may nevertheless result in a disturbance ofa right of market and so be
unlawful even if the rival market goes by another name. Thus
labelling the activity as a "club", for example, will not prevent the
activity from being closed down if the court is satisfied that it is, in
law, a market. 15 This is so, it will be recalled, wherever there is a
concourse or gathering ofbuyers and sellers- a defmition which is so
remarkably wide as to give rise to rival (and so vulnerable) markets in
many unintended circumstances, such as, for example, where certain
kinds of auction are arranged. 16
Markets can earn significant profits for the organiser. These
derive from the charges made to traders (and sometimes buyers) who
come to the market to buy and sell. A brief survey of these charges
may be ventured since it is this lucrative revenue which provides the
real incentive to market creation and operation.
Stallage or Rent
It is a fundamental principle ofthe common law that a franchise
or statutory (ie lawful) market is open to all members of the public to
come and buy and sell. This rule does not apply to informal markets.
However, whilst buyers and sellers have a right to come to a franchise
or statutory market to trade, the seller becomes a trespasser if, without
consent, he attempts to gain an exclusive occupation ofpart of the soil
of the market/ 7 perhaps by placing a basket or using a stall in a part
offered for sale, the proximity of the individual sellers one to another and the degree of control
retained by the organiser.
Il
16
17
Staffordshire BC v Elkenford (1976) 75 LGR 337
Supra n (6)
Northampton Corporation v Ward (1745) 2 Stra 1238
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ofthe market place. His occupation of that space excludes others from
it. Thus permission to trade in this manner is required from the
owner or lessee of the soil (normally the market organiser) to use or
to place any stall or barrow in the market. The fee normally charged for
this consent is traditionally known as stallage which is, in effect, no
more than rent.
If a stall is erected without permission, an action will lie for the
benefit of the owner or lessee against the stall holder, the occupier of
the soil, for stallage upon an implied contract. IS Stallage is thus a
matter of agreement, either express or presumed. This is important
because the right to recover it is not normally an incident to the grant
creating the market. Because ownership of the market and ofthe soil
of the market place may be vested in different individuals it is possible
that stallage may not enrich the market owner. This is because there is
no rule that the market place must be vested in the owner ofthe market
right; he is entitled to hold the market on land on which he has a
tenancy or even a mere licence to hold it. 19 There is some authority
that if the market owner does not have exclusive possession of the soil
of the market place he is not entitled to charge stallage.20
Stallage cannot be imposed on a seller who does not seek to trade
from a particular site in the market place. This perhaps causes less
difficulty today than it once might have done. In times past many
individuals used to attend market to sell their goods without taking a
stall. The "hawker" could sell his goods free of charge. Such a rule
could cause difficulties in practice because a "hawker" was entitled to
place his goods upon the ground when wearyY Similarly, when
making a sale he could [md himself in one site for a substantial period,
especially if his goods were so popular that he was, in effect, selling
continuously. At what point did he become liable to stallage? In
practice, this was never satisfactorily resolved.
18
20
Mayor ofNewport v Saunders 3 B & Ad 411
(1884) 14 QBD 245
Lockwood v Wood (I 841) 6 QB 31 butA-G v Horner (1886) II App Cas 66
Mayor ofYarmouth v Groom [1862] I H & C 102
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TOLL
The Nature of Toll
Coke defined toll as Ita reasonable sum of money due to the
owner of the fair or market upon sale ofthings tollable within (it).'122
Toll, properly so called, is a levy payable on goods sold in
market. 23 Originally it was seen as a charge made of buyers for the
prospect of undisputed ownership which a purchase in a public market
offered.24 Toll was thus levied on goods and was normally payable by
the buyer and not the seller.
Because toll was supposed to be collected from buyers its
collection posed significant practical problems. Gradually market
owners seem either to have abandoned the system of tolls, preferring
instead to replace the lost revenue by increasing stallage,25 or to have
switched the burden oftolls to sellers. In A-G v Horner No226 it was
held that such a practice was not sufficient to give the owner a power
to demand toll from sellers as of right.
The Right to Toll
It must first be understood that the grant of a right of market
(perhaps by Charter) did not by itself necessarily confer the right to
take toll. That right might depend upon the terms ofthe original grant.
If these did not support a right to toll a separate grant or franchise of
toll would be required.27 Many markets were toll free. Where they
were not, toll was collected by an official of the market.
It is true, however, that where there is a long custom of taking
22
24
26
27
Co Inst 220
Sometimes toll was levied even on unsold goods
Duke ofBedford v St Paul Covent Garden Overseers (1881) 51 LJMC 41, 55 Bowen J
Eg, Swindon Central Market Co Ltd v Panting (1872) 27 LT 578
[1913] 2 Ch 140
Heddy v Wheelhouse [1598] Cra Eliz 558. A right may however arise by prescription
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toll, the court may enforce it even ifno actual evidence of a franchise
of toll can be found, because the right may be established by the
doctrine of prescription, or presumed lost grant. Alternatively, a court
may presume that the highway on which the trading takes place was
dedicated subject to the right to exact tolls for trading thereon.28
These traditional revenues are supplemented in modem markets
(such as car boot sales) by a small charge made of individual buyers
entering the market. This charge is lawful because these markets are
not franchise markets which permit members ofthe public to enter the
market as ofright. The organiser is thus exercising a private law power
to charge a fee for a licence or permission to enter the land upon which
the market is held.
A principal reason for these charges, which are normally of a de
minimis character, is that mere imposition of a charge, of itself, takes
the market outside the statutory street trading regime.29 If no charge
were imposed, the local authority could take steps, in effect to prohibit
the market. One means of doing so is to designate the market area as
a prohibited street so that anyone trading therein would commit an
offence.3o
In sum, the very significant profits which can be gained from
organising markets have led to considerable expansion in unlawful
market activity and a renewed entrepreneurial interest in their creation.
There are two means by which an intending market organiser may
organise a new market without acting unlawfully. The difficulty is
that, in each of these cases, his market will not have the right of
monopoly; in fact its operation will depend upon the consent of the
owner of market rights in the locality of the new market.
(i) Licensing Arrangements
The owners of franchise (Charter) or statutory rights of market
have a power to license or consent to others to organise markets within
Lmvrence v Hitch [1868] LR 3 QB 521
29 Para I, Sched 4 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1982
Contrary to para 10 of Sched 4 of the 1982 Act
31
Mountbatten Journal of Legal Studies
their franchise area, usually in return for payment. This is commonly
done by local authorities who may well demand a percentage of the
turnover subject to a fixed minimum fee. In 1993 one licensed
operation in a large urban area was charged whichever was the greater,
5% of its gross revenue or £90,000. Any licensing agreement means
that the new market is a lawful one, but it will normally lack the
monopolistic attributes of the franchise.
(ii) Acquisition of Market Rights
In the absence of such a licensing arrangement a would-be
market organiser must acquire the rights of market for the relevant
area. This is usually achieved either by leasing or by purchasing an
existing franchise. Whichever ofthe above courses ofaction is chosen,
the existing market owner clearly has the right to veto the organisation
of the proposed market. According to one argument, it cannot be
satisfactory that this is so. The opportunity for a rival to organise
markets within a district should not be made to depend upon the
consent of the individual or organisation which has existing trading
rights therein. Nevertheless, the established market owner can refuse
to license the would-be rival because there is clearly no obligation
either to lease or to sell the franchise right.
Whether to avoid this veto or merely to cut costs, in practice
many new markets do not have the consent ofthe relevant right owner;
they are markets of an informal or unofficial character which are
vulnerable to the monopoly rights of market owners. Their operation
can be restrained by injunction3! and the organisers may be liable in
damages for losses inflicted upon the franchise market.
Problems of Competition
The question is whether the state can justifiably continue legally
to enforce this anti-competitive behaviour. One dimension of this
31 Supra
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controversy surrounding the creation ofnew markets focuses upon the
changing perceptions of the proper roles of the public and private
sectors. This is because, by the twentieth century, most market rights
have been acquired by local authorities some of whom may operate
council markets for the benefit of their locality. These local authorities
are traditionally (but not universally) suspicious of entrepreneurial
initiatives intended to create new markets within their area, because
some of these markets have aroused local hostility and caused public
order and nuisance problems. Such markets may detrimentally affect
amenities and often cause a significant increase in road traffic. There
is also a frequently expressed concern that, for example, car boot sales
provide an outlet for stolen or pirate goods and even contraband
alcohol. Some traders operate in breach of public health and consumer
protection safeguards. Local authorities are not therefore easily
persuaded that new markets will be beneficial in the local community
a fortiori where they provide their own market(s). Because these
authorities are often themselves the present owners of franchise or
statutory market rights they can often rely on their "private" monopoly
powers to restrain potential competition from would-be market
operators. Development control powers can be added to the private
law rights of local authorities who thus have extensive powers to
restrain competition. Market operation in modem Britain is very much
controlled by the public sector which frequently exercises its powers
with particular vigour where new rivals defy the law (by providing
unlawful competition for a council operated market). Is this
dominance justifiable in contemporary society? To answer this
question it is necessary to examine the early purposes underlying
modem law.
The Origin and Purpose of Market Rights
As we have seen, there are persuasive arguments that market
monopolies are an anachronism which no longer serve a useful modem
purpose. It is important, however, to recognise that the issue is not
entirely one-sided.
Markets and the monopolistic rights incidental to the right of
33
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markets were originally created to preserve public order. Anglo-Saxon
laws often insisted that buying and selling took place before
witnesses.32 These witnesses were necessary to protect the buyer from
claims that goods purchased had been dishonestly acquired.
Transactions within the market place were more easily subjected to
public scrutiny; title to goods would be observed to pass from seller
to buyer, a consequence of importance not only to the parties to the
transaction but also the public at large.33 The franchise of markets
could be regarded as a mechanism for delegating to private individuals
a law-and-order function, which would otherwise have been the
responsibility of the State. Such franchises were an effective use of
State power because it would have been impossible for the State to
achieve its goals without co-operation at a local level. The self-interest
ofthe market operator provided the best means ofensuring the success
ofthe market. Therefore, the burden ofthe public responsibility ofthe
market was made more attractive by the profit that the market would
generate for the owner. The franchise brought monopolistic rights to
ensure commercial supremacy through the exclusion of those
(unlicensed) competitors who own markets and could be said (as a
matter of fact and law) to damage the success of the lawful market
owner.
In the contemporary commercial environment such arguments
for the continued existence of the monopoly ostensibly look
somewhat fragile. But it is possible to found a case (albeit an
unfashionable one) for continuing market monopolies enjoyed by
local authorities.
As the Government recognises, the existence of a market
monopoly also serves an economic purpose. By licensing "rival"
market operators in return for a fee, local authorities generate
significant income for the purposes of their general revenue. This
means that the local authority need not provide a market itself, but can
derive revenue from those whom it allows to do so. This is itself
32
3J
See Pollock and Maitland, The History ofEnglish Law, 2nd edition 1968, p 59; Edgar IV, 6;
Canute, II 24; 1 Edw I; 2 Athelstan 12.
See Duke ofBedford v. St. Paul Covent Garden Overseers (1881) 51 LJMC 41, 55, per Bowen
1.
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controversial (depending upon one's political standpoint) because the
licensing fees can be seen either as a further burden on business
enterprise, or a means by which businesses contribute to the
communities in which they derive their profits. The real issue is that
the local authority's general revenue is augmented by the arrangement
thereby relieving burdens on local taxpayers at a time when central
government grants are becomingly miserly. At one level this might be
politically acceptable if it were viewed as a form of commercial
activity by local authorities designed to reduce their reliance on tax
revenue.
This argument, however, has not found favour with central
government which, as a part of its programme of de-regulation,
attempted to initiate reforms designed to stimulate local private
enterprise. These reforms culminated in clauses 21-23 of the
Deregulation and Contracting Out Bill 1994 which were intended to
remove the monopolistic rights of local authority owned markets, as
well as local authorities' statutory powers to restrain certain sales
outside the market. Nothing in the Bill, however, was intended to alter
the market rights of private market owners.
This seemed to tum the only argument for continuing market
monopolies on its head. Such arguments as there are for continuing the
monopoly seemed only to apply to local authority markets where the
monopoly can be exercised to further the interests of good government
of the local area. In essence the arguments for reform actually bear
most heavily upon privately owned rather than local authoritymarkets
which stifle competition to further the private interest of the owner
rather than the inhabitants of the local area.
Whatever view is adopted, local authorities successfully lobbied
backbenchers by invoking the spectre of unregulated markets and car
boot sales, and the controversial proposals were dropped from the
Bill. 34
The Government's response was to maintain its commitment to
the principle ofreform. The continuing commitment to reform means
J4 He Debs, Vol 248, cols 184-185, 18 October 1994.
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that the monopoly powers of local authorities are unlikely to survive
far into the future.
The Highway as the Market Place
One difficult area, which suffers from a considerable
indeterminacy, which has never satisfactorily been resolved, concerns
the regulation of markets which are held on the highway. The
problems extend to street trading which is not conducted in a lawful
market. This may either be trading in an informal street market, or
something falling short of a market - perhaps the stationing of a stall
or van upon the highway. This issue is important because it, in part,
concerns the limit of the statutory controls over street trading (and
thereby the controls over trading in street markets).
It is fundamental that informal markets fall within the statutory
scheme of regulation under the Local Government (Miscellaneous
Provisions) Act 1982, which means that trading therein can only take
place under the authority ofa licence/consent if the local authority has
adopted the licensing scheme for the street in which trading takes
place.35 However, lawful markets are exempted from these controls
so that traders are not required to obtain a licence/consent even if the
street is designated as one where trading can otherwise only take place
under the authority of a licence/consent. This is because market
trading in lawful charter or statutory markets is deemed not to be
"street trading" for the purposes ofthe 1982 Act.36
It is important that it is normally only in lawful markets that
traders may operate without causing an obstruction of the highway
contrary to s137 of the Highways Act 1980, since their trading in
pursuance of a market right has "lawful excuse".37 This is not so in
Street trading is defined in para I of schedule 4 of the 1982 Act. Under para 2 streets may be
designated according to one of three categories. The controls do not apply to streets which have
not been so designated.
36 Para 1 of Schedule 4 'of the 1982 Act
See Simpson v Wells (1875) 39 JP 581 and GER v Goldsmid (1884) 9 App Cas 927 especially
per Lord Selbome LC at p 942. However, it is possible to envisage cases in which informal or
customary trading which does not take place under the authority of a statute or charter may in
36
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informal markets, or trading outside markets.
Before examining the issues further it may be noted that where
trading on the highway is concerned, informal markets are normally
not of recent creation. Often they are customary markets of great age
and antiquity. When compared with lawful, charter markets, they may,
in fact, be of similar importance and age (but of different origin) and
yet be differently regulated.
Because the issues are complex a summary will be offered
below:
(i) Lawful (statutory or charter) markets. Here trading does not
require the authority of a licence/consent from the local authority. It
seems that that which is done in pursuance of market rights is not an
obstruction of the highway contrary to s137 of the Highways Act
1980.38
(ii) Trading in informal or customary markets. Here the absence of
market rights exposes traders to the risk ofa conviction for obstruction
of the highway.39 The market traders do not benefit from the
exemption in the Local Government (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act
1982 and must obtain a licence/consent where the street is so
designated. If the street is not designated the trading is subject only to
general highway law.
(iii) Trading which falls short ofa market. If the street in which it
takes place has been appropriately designated it is an offence to trade
some cases not amount to an obstruction since "lawful excuse" might be established where the
highway can be presumed to be dedicated subject to the rights oftraders: see eg, Elwood v Bullock
(1844) 6 QB 383 which seems to permit such an outcome. It would have to be open to the court
to infer that the highway may (and not necessarily must) have been laid out after the customary
trading was established: per Lord Denman at p 411.
l8
39
InA G v Horner (1886) 11 App Cas 66 the COurl also found that the highway in question had been
laid out after the creation of the market and so the public's right of passage was subject to the
rights ofmarket.
Simpson v Wells (1872) LR 7 QB 214
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without a licence or consent.40 The general highway law is also
applicable. As in (ii) this also means that in undesignated streets the
law ofobstruction ofthe highways assumes considerable importance.41
However, as will be seen below, traders operating in accordance with
a long-established custom may fmd that the court will presume that the
highway on which they trade was dedicated to the public subject to the
rights of the traders. This means that the public only ever obtained a
qualified right of free passage. The traders have a right to trade and so
a "lawful excuse" within the meaning ofs137. Whilst a conviction for
obstruction is thus not possible, the local authority can designate the
street so that (despite the long-established custom) it would be an
offence to trade without a licence/consent.
The above rules indicate that the distinction between lawful
markets on the one hand and unlawful markets and street trading on the
other can have fundamental consequences. Were the distinctions
between these classes oftrading not ofconsiderable indeterminacy the
law might be in a more certain and satisfactory state. The reality,
especially in relation to categories (i) and (ii) above, is that the
distinction can be one without a real difference and that the law has an
almost arbitrary character. This is so because market rights (and so
lawful markets) can arise by prescription or under the doctrine of
presumed lost grant. These principles allow the courts to legitimate a
long-established and customary arrangement even though there is no
evidence that the market was actually created by lawful means. Thus
some, but not all informal, customary markets will acquire the clothes
oflegality. As will be seen, this means that although, in practice, two
markets may each have similar, informal origins one may be treated
differently from another and so become unlawful where the first is
lawful. The same is true of other street trading, some examples of
which can be conducted lawfully on a highway even ifunlicensed.
Para 10 of schedule 4 of the 1982 Act
ego Nagy v Weston [1965]1 WLR 280
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Prescription
The detailed rules governing establishing market rights by
prescription lie beyond the scope of the present article, but essentially
there are alternative means of founding a customary right. The first is
less controversial than the second. In the former, a customary right of
market can arise ifthere is "uninterrupted modem usage" of20 or more
years provided that there is no evidence that at some time after 1189
the right asserted did not exist.42 This means of establishing user as of
right is difficult because it is often possible to show that within the
period of legal memory the market was not conducted.
The second means involves the doctrine of "lost modem grant"
by which the court will presume that a grant of market was made but
that the documentary evidence of such a grant has been lost or
destroyed. This is essentially a legal fiction because the courts will
invoke such a doctrine even ifthey are reasonably certain that no grant
ever existed. Thus the doctrine is simply a device for preserving
socially acceptable customary markets. This bold doctrine seems to
bear cogent witness to a policy of the law, which is that the courts
will seek to preserve certain long-established and customary markets
and endow them with a legal pedigree where it is reasonable to do SO.43
The fIption cannot otherwise be explained or justified.
rhe problem is that this policy is inconsistently applied and this
arbitrariness is capable ofcausing substantial difficulty. Some ancient
markets are deemed to be lawful; others with similar characteristics and
importance are not. The explanation for this arbitrary and
unsatisfactory distinction lies in the conflicting alternative doctrinal
approaches which the courts can adopt. It is true that at one level the
courts appear to be asking whether the traders are, in some private law
sense, the beneficiaries of a legal right to trade. As indicated above,
this examines the origins both of the market and the legal regime
affecting the site (normally the highway). This is described more fully
42 Hulbert v Dale [1909] 2 Ch 570
Angus v Dalton (1877) 3 QBD 85; (1878) 4 QBD 162; (1881) 6 App Case 740; also
Tehidy Minerals Ltd v Norman [1971] 2 QB 528.
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below. An alternative approach allows the courts to exploit more fully
the legal fictions than others. Here the court in fact passes over the
clouded and antiquarian inquiry about the origins of market and
highway respectively and focuses instead upon the reasonableness of
the market use as a contemporary rather than an historical issue. This
latter approach explains why the courts are so willing to "presume"
lawful origins despite the complete absence of evidence. Moreover, if
the obstruction caused by the market is a temporary and not a complete
obstruction (as might be so where the trading occurs in a customary
fair) the courts may be willing to regard it as reasonable and will
rationalise this by blurring the question of origin.44
The so-called "hiring", "mop" or "statute" fairs, or "statute
sessions" provide a problematic and unsatisfactory example of this
dichotomy. These fairs are customary events which began to be held
following the Statute of Labourers 1351. The Black Death had so
diminished the working population that labourers and servants were in
short supply. Competition for the services ofthe survivors became so
extreme that wage inflation reached unacceptable levels. The 1351
Statute was intended to maximise the work force available by measures
which, in effect, conscripted individuals to work. At a macro-economic
level, the Act legislated an anti-inflationary policy which required
magistrates to fix wages in the locality and the wages thus set would
be binding upon employers and employees alike. The annual
pronouncements of the magistrates were of such a significance that
masters and servants would often gather near the court building to hear
the result of the magisterial deliberations for the year ahead. Thomas
Hardy, for example, describes how when these fairs became a means
by which employers could fmd suitable labour, would-be employees
would attend these fairs in order to fmd employment, many carrying
the symbol of their trade.45 A large number of these customary fairs
still continue, often as amusement fairs, their original purpose having
44
45
As, for example, in Elwood v Bullock (1844) 6 QB 383.
eg, Far From the Madding Crowd, the New Wessex Edition, Macmillan, 1974, p 75. An
apparent example in which the carrying ofa symbol of trade or business in a market which does
not appear to be a hiring fair can be seen in The Woodlanders, Penguin Classics, 1986, p 76.
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been superseded. They are frequently of ancient ongm and yet,
because they are known not to have been created by a charter they are
not "lawful" events. This was decided in Simpson v Wells46 where a
street trader was convicted of an offence for having placed a stall on
the highway during a "statute sessions" which was found to be of great
antiquity. It was not disputed that no offence would have occurred if
he had traded in a lawful market created by grant or presumed grant.
The accused argued, unsuccessfully in this case, that because of the
ancient origin of the fair, the right to trade should be inferred from
custom, in particular because, ex hypothesi, the fair had been conducted
for more than 20 years. His defence failed because the fair was known
not to have been created by charter. Trading on the highway was thus
an offence.
Similarly, this private law approach was also fatal in Spice v
Peacock47 where the court insisted on searching for a conditional
dedication of the highway and refused to presume one where the
highway was an immemorial one and the trading only arose within
living memory. This meant, ofcourse, that the traders could not assert
a private right over the highway (because they could not establish a
right which was first in time) and so lost their suit. The failure to
establish this beneficial right meant that the public may well have been
deprived of a reasonable and useful market. This demonstrates how
the private law model sublimates questions of public interest to those
of private right.
Private law reasoning also dominated in Jones v Mathews 48
(although with a different result) where, in the absence of direct
evidence as to the nature and scope ofa dedication ofa highway made
within the previous 30 years, the laying out of the highway did not
divest individuals of a customary right to trade which they had
exercised in the last forty years. A prior right to trade therefore
prevailed over the public's right of free passage over the highway.
However, the courts can alternatively appear to be applying a
[1872] LR 7 QR 214
(1875) 39 JP 581
48 [1885] 1 TLR 482
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private law model but employing it in such a way as to disguise what
is in substance something entirely different. This essentially disregards
the actual origin of the trading (that is, whether or not actually created
by a charter) and asks instead whether it is reasonable in all the
circumstances. This was so in Le Neve v The Vestry ofMile End Old
Town49 where for many years the occupiers of certain property had
made use (for street trading purposes) ofa strip ofland used as a public
highway. This lay between the carriageway and the footway. In
purported exercise of statutory powers the Vestry removed the
obstructions placed on the land. The court held that the Vestry had
exceeded its powers because it could be presumed that the traders
occupied the land with the permission ofthe lord ofthe manor and that,
when the highway was laid out, it was dedicated to the public subject
to the rights of the traders. There was no positive evidence that such
permission had been granted, nor of a conditional dedication of the
highway. It is clear that here the court was essentially unconcerned by
the origins of the trading; the only question was whether it was
reasonable. This must have entailed some implicit balancing exercise
in which the court found that the trading did not unreasonably interfere
with the public's right of free passage.
Elwood v Bullock'° is to similar effect. In accordance with an
ancient custom, licensed victuallers placed "booths" on a highway
during a fair. Here again, although there was absolutely no evidence
that the highway had been laid out after the creation of the fair, the
court was willing to presume a conditional dedication of the highway
so that the right of public passage was subject to the rights of the
licensed victuallers.
These latter decisions illustrate how the courts will stretch
established principle in order to achieve just results. Lord Denman CJ
admitted that the decision in Elwood was founded on issues ofpublic
policy when he stated that the public's right of passage was not more
important nor beneficial than the right of the licensed victuallers (from
which the public also derived a benefit). In other words, the decision
(1858)8E&B 1054
1O [1844] 6 QB 383
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was essentially founded on the balancing exercise in which the court
favoured the use which it perceived as more socially beneficial.
The reality is that this approach actually ignores both the history
of the site and the origin of the market (hence the willingness of the
court to presume an origin in the absence of any evidence whatsoever)
and instead focuses on the question of the importance of the market
judged against competing contemporary uses. This seems sensible.
Where there is no evidence of a charter it is surely unimportant that a
market may have been created in more recent times than the reign of
Richard I. Since no individual can show a positive right to conduct the
market, the issue is essentially whether its continued operation is in the
public interest. This kind of inquiry must arguably provide the best
solution to the difficult questions with which the court is faced.
It is not without significance that this approach can also be seen
where the courts are confronted with giving meaning to charter rights
but in the context ofmodem district boundaries. Here again the courts
have moulded the common law to recognise modem trading
conditions. This is so where a district which benefited from market
rights has expanded beyond the boundaries which were current at the
time ofthe charter. Narrow private law reasoning would suggest that
sites within the enlarged district could not benefit from the rights
created by the charter, (unless the terms ofthe charter were otherwise)
since ~he charter rights would normally be construed as having been
granted to the district existing at the date of the grant. But the courts
have not felt bound to apply the logic of this approach. Instead,
ancient charter rights can normally be interpreted as extending
throughout the modem boundaries of a district even where it has
expanded, or the centre of population moved.51
In conclusion, the narrow private law approach leads in practice
to arbitrary outcomes subjecting all hiring fairs to more extensive
regulation than that which applies to other markets and fairs of equal
significance but perhaps of more recent date. It is also open to
criticism because its focus is historical. It seems unimportant that the
market, though conducted in pursuit of a private right, is unsuited to
" Killmls!er v Fitton (1885) 53 LT 959
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modem conditions. For example, market rights may attach to a
highway and so legalise certain trading in an area which, in modem
times, has become a busy commercial district causing much
inconvenience to traffic. 52 But the private law approach treats the
continued trading as a vested private legal right which prevails over the
public right of free passage. This creates an ideological tension with
more modem and utilitarian regimes, such as planning law, for
controlling the use of land.53
The operation of the presumptions and principles of this aspect
of market law has a fictional quality to it. That the livelihood of
individual traders should depend upon whether their market was
created as a matter of custom sometime after the enactment of the
Statute ofLabourers or in a charter (possibly ofeven more recent date)
is a matter ofregret. The focus should instead be placed upon whether
the use made of the highway is a reasonable one taking into account,
as Lord Denman CJ stated in Elwood v Bullock'4 the benefit the public
may derive from the market, and also its duration and the degree of
obstruction it causes. This approach would treat all long established,
customary and lawful markets alike. Any other approach is an attempt
to forge a distinction without a difference.
Barry Hough
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"
"
At Chipping Norton, for example, an annual fair, (possibly in fonner times a Michaelmas hiring
fair) can cause the diversion of traffic on a major trunk road, sometimes resulting in considerable
delays.
See, for example, Spook Erection v Secretary ofState for the Environment (1988) 86 LGR 736.
This concerned the application of planning controls to the revival of an ancient charter market.
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